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1. Taking over of power 
By the turn of 1973-74, the policy of the government in Portugal came to a 
deadlock, mainly because of the hopeless colonial wars.1 Although the more and 
more frequent actions of mass demonstrations and resistance movements did not 
shake the state apparatus, they did increase its inner tension, thus advancing the 
crystallization of a power change that developed from within the repressive or-
ganization itself, the colonial army. 
During the war, especially from 1968, the social composition and stratification 
characteristic of the body of officers changed (it consisted increasingly of modern 
middle-class citizens, thus a new military intellectual-class took shape), its ideo-
logical and later its political foundations were shaken: they realized the hopeless-
ness of victory. The lack of a government policy promising military victory, and a 
decrease in the professional level and prestige of the army were joined by a threa-
tening prospect of an unjust calling to account The inflexibility of the government 
- renewing the tradition of pronunciamento - developed the idea of the necessity 
of an interference in politics. 
A representative of one of the political trends of the army, general Ant6nio 
de Spinola, the "unlikeliest liberal", became the vice-chief of general staff and the 
deputy-chief of Costa Gomes after a long colonial service, in January, 1974. In the 
spring of 1972, as a Guinean commander-in-chief, he had summed up his position 
1 This essay forms part of dissertation of a candidacy (Debrecen, 1985) titled Social-political fights in 
Portugal, 1961-1976 (A study of case of the allied bloc of power). Regarding antecedents see the 
following works of the author: Years of Salazar-dictatorship (1926-1961); Portugal, 1968: Stabiliza-
tion or development? (Historical addition to quandary of reform); Antifascist resistance and the 
colonial question in Portugal (1961-1974). These works were published in the following periodicals: 
Századok (Budapest) 1987/6 (pp. 1061-1100); Világtörténet (Budapest) 1986/3-4 (pp. 120-144); Acta 
Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József Nominate. Sectio Scientiae Socialismi (Szeged) T. XXII. 
1987 (pp. 177-209). 
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in the statement: "This war can not be won in Guinea, but can be lost in Lisbon".2 
His conception, which he outlined in his book titled Portugal And Its Future (Feb-
ruary, 1974), promised federation to the liberation movements in return for fini-
shing the war, and thus his policy differed from that of the prime minister, Mar-
celo Caetano (although he agreed with the bridging of the "African" and the 
"European" interest groups of the ruling classes of the motherland). 
In Spinola-ism, the fighting army itself turned against the war. This "libera-
lized" colonialism had a chance of success only by relying on an untouched bu-
reaucracy and repressive organization, namely: the "strong democracy" of a conser-
vative presidential regime. 
After President of the Republic Spinola's aspirations had failed at the 1972 
elections, and after he had tried in vain to put pressure on the political leadership 
in the spirit of the following slogan: "The army is not the pretorian guard of 
power", he was dismissed together with his supporters (in March, 1974). It became 
clear that he could not change the politics of the government in a legal way. 
Nevertheless there was an urgent need for change, so as to prevent the forming 
orthodox Salazarist turn and a possible explosion coming from the lower ranks. It 
also became clear that - as military-political factions of privilegized groups were 
paralysing one another - the "generals" could only achieve the subversion of the 
government with the help of an illegal movement of the "captains" (middle-ranks 
officers who were in the centre of military charges such as Vasco Gongalves, Melo 
Antunes and Saraiva de Carvalho). 
A political organization, the CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, had been developing in 
the army since the au tumn of 1973. Its purpose was the establishment of a democ-
ratic regime for a peaceful settlement of the colonial question (in the spirit of the 
admission of the peoples' principle of self-determination) and the retrieving of lost 
military prestige. According to their starting-point: "it was impossible to achieve 
2 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: O Movimento dos CapitSes e o 25 de Abril - 229 dios 
para derrubar o fascismo. Lisboa: Moraes, 1974. p. 245. 
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aims forced on them by a power that denies the fact that it lacks the suitable 
means of implementing its politics."3 
This new movement was crystallized by March, 1974 as The ARMED FORCES 
MOVEMENT (Movimento das Forças Armadas - MFA). The movement wanted to 
subvert the power, out as they were shattered by the dismissals in March, they 
were forced to search for allies, which they finally found: the Spinola-ists. Spinola 
could guarantee the alliance or neutrality of the society and the army, especially 
the apolitical majority of the colonial body of officers; the external and internal 
capitalist groups (first of all the greatest Champalimaud-group supporting him 
directly); the Great Powers and the international organizations involved (NATO 
above all); and the Catholic Church. 
According to the "PROGRAM OF THE MFA", the compromised platform of the 
above trends,4 even "after thirteen years of fighting overseas, the existing political 
system has not succeeded in defining a concrete and objective overseas policy that 
leads to peace among Portuguese of all races and beliefs". Therefore, settling a 
peace strategy opposed to the government which lost its legitimacy "was possible 
only after the purging of the present internal policies and its institutions, and 
transforming them to be real representatives of the Portuguese people in a democ-
ratic way". . 
The program set forth that "the solution for the overseas war must be a politi-
cal and not a military one", that an open and national debate was needed about 
the colonial question, and that an "overseas policy leading to peace" should be 
established therein.5 A Spinola-ist inspired passage, that the present power "must 
acknowledge its international obligations arising from contracts in force", purposed 
to calm the international environment.6 
3 Orlando Neves (org. e introd.): Textos históricos da Revoluqao. Vol. I. Lisboa: Diabril, 1975. p. 16. 
4 Ibid. p. 41. 
5 Ibid. p. 45. 
6 Ibid. 
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Behind the alliance of the "liberalising" Conservative Spinola-ists and the 
revolutionary-democrat "Captains", stood the compromise of the modern finance-
oligarchy, the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, which covered the domestically orien-
ted (middle-) bourgeoisie, and the working class, also. The external economic and 
political groups, attached to the alliance by the monopol groups, accepted the fall 
of the Salazarist regime, but needed a two to three year transition period in the 
colonies and Portuguese protection so as to preserve their positions. This could be 
guaranteed by Spinola's conservative presidential regime. 
The organizers and precise executors of the taking over of power, prepared in 
the above way, were the "captains": the Political Coordinating Committee (CCP) 
ruled by colonel Vasco Gongalves and the military centre directed by major Sara-
iva de Carvalho. The military action starting at the dawn of 25th April subverted 
the authoritarian dictatorship of Caetano within the same day. 
31% of the "captains", 14% of the headquarters of the Portuguese military 
units, and hardly 5% of the whole army participated actively in the action, and th|s 
fact shows the frailty of the victory and thus the significance of the preliminary 
alliance. Half of the military forces was "politically amorphous", while the 45% 
who were demaged in their interests were neutralized at the moment.7 
The "palace revolution" appearance of the taking over of power, its bloodless-
ness and rapidity, was thus the condition of victory. However, it became the source 
of later problems: the smashing of the repressive organization and the shattering , 
of the bureaucracy did not happen; it created the illusion of a national unity dela-
ying the clarification of fronts; the purge of the new power did not happen; and it 
did not help to overcome tfie weakness of the democratic resistance movement, 
. either. 
According to the earlier compromise, with the participation of Spinola and six 
of his fellow generals, a new summit organization was founded: the JUNTA OF NA-
TIONAL SALVATION (Junta de Salvagao Narional - JSN). 
7 Diniz de Almeida, E.: AscensSo, apogeu e queda do MFA. Vol I. Lisboa: Sociais, 1978. p. 15. 
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During the political "wildcat sheme craze", after the taking over of power, and 
until the government came into office 54, and by July some 80, organizations were 
established which can be regarded as parties. The well-organized powers of the 
opposition, having cadres, a program and experience, came to light at once with 
great force. The mass movement, which started in earlier months and was peaking 
now, corresponded in several points to the trends of the PORTUGUESE COMMU-
NIST PARTY (PCP), the PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS), the INTERSINDICAL 
oppositional trade union centre, the parties of the extreme left and the "captains". 
Their mutual pressure made the program, and especially the Spinola-ist concep-
tion, antiquated even in the first days^a purge by the lower ranks, de facto activity 
of parties, de jure acknowledgement of trade unions, dismissal of the Corporative 
Chamber, amnesty for deserters, dismissal of the legislature of Mozambique and 
Guinea etc.). 
Limitation of the change to a conservative presidential system had already 
been frustrated by this time: besides the stepping up of the army, the euphoric 
atmosphere also blocked the repressive organization, paralyzed the central and 
local bureaucracy, and the made the right-wing (which had lost its political support 
because of the uttler powerlessness of the Salazarist state) withdraw. This Alianga 
Povo-MFA ('people-MFA alliance'), the de facto alliance between the "captains" 
and the civil left-wing, created the possibility of the development of a revolutio-
nary process. From this stage, the relationship between the monopol power and 
democratic human rights became a direct problem of the change from dictatorship 
to democracy. 
In spite of a lack of organization, Caetano's earlier "young liberalists" ap-
peared as a significant force. The group of the POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
(PPD), forming now with the leadership of Sd Carneiro, was the inheritor of the 
"liberal wing" of the National Assembly elected in 1969. 
After three weeks, the constitutional law No. 3/74 of 14th May outlined the 
provisional political system of Portugal. Consequently,8 for the planned one year 
8 Orlando Neves op. tit. pp. 56-66. 
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before the election of a Constituent National Assembly, a power took shape which 
was highly separated in its institutions. 
Spinola,#who came to office as provisional President of the Republic on 15th 
May, was the president of JSN and the Council of State and the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces. He elected or dismissed the government (which was 
responsible only towards him), he took care of constitutionalism and announced 
laws auid orders. Regarding constitutional law, he was only responsible "towards 
the nation" and could effectively be limited by the JSN. The position became the 
centre of power of Spinola-ists. The right of appointment of military leaders was 
given tó the authority of the JSN, thus the armed forces were made independent 
from the government (that is, from the civil power). In this, Chief of General Staff 
Costa Gomes was equal with the Prime Minister. 
In the civil provisional government, which came into office on May 16th and 
had limited authority, the MFA forced a wide alliance which earlier could not 
have been established by the powers of the opposition. The consensus referred to 
the Constituent National Assembly. "Free elections to the Constituent National 
Assembly will be enormously significant - as the first proclamation of the com-
munist party stated after the turn - and this will open the process of the democra-
tic change of the Portuguese society. This purpose must not be distorted on any 
pretext."9 Two labour parties also participated in the liberálist and social-democra-
tic dominated government (Mário Soares socialist party leader became Foreign 
Secretary and Álvaro Cunhal communist party leader became a minister without 
portfolio). 
The consultative and constituent COUNCIL OF STATE, which had crystallized 
by the end of May, became the only institution of power in which the anonymous 
"captains" were represented - therefore it became the main field of political batt-
les. Besides the seven members each of CCP and JSN (the two de facto centres of 
power), seven more members were appointed by Spinola, so that a conservative-
liberal hegemony prevailed in the Council of State. 
9 Dofcumentos do CC do PCP (Abril - Dezembro de 1974). Lisboa: Avante, 1975. pp. 18-19. 
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However the "captains" possessed a coniderable real power: they disposed 
directly of the dominant military units, tried to control every important institution 
of power, they could count on the support of the left-wing, as well as the labour of 
large-scale industry, the modern middle-class citizens, the soldiers, and the sou-
thern agricultural proletariat (which meant an active mass base). Though the 
revolution was definitely that of the capital at its beginning, as the country masses 
did not move in the first few months. 
The pillar of the institutional power was set up by military groups represented 
by Spinola, monopols represented by economic co-ordinating minister Vieira de 
Almeida and the block of centrist powers (and the right-wing behind them) led by 
S£ Carneiro. Its content was determined by the alliance of the ruling class and 
popular classes with the dominance of the former one. 
This formula of power had limited the purpose of the big bourgeoisie in 
advance, opening a way towards a quicker and wider capitalist modernization (by 
relieving the country of the dead weight of the colonial war and the corporate 
mechanism). The proceeding wage-demands questioned the competitiveness based 
on a cheap labour force. The democartic claims jeopardized the political power of 
capital, the decolonizational trends imperiled its economic position in Africa. The 
big-bourgeoisie could rely neither on a repressive organization, nor on a party 
policy structure. 
2. Failure of the "liberalized" colonialism 
The solution of the problem initially followed a line in compliance with the 
constitution of power, in the spirit of Spinola-ism which purposed to restore the 
"climate of institutionalized legitimacy". 
The time-table for settling the colonial question was the following10 (with the 
exception of Macau and Timor): 
1. armistice, in return for which Portugal promised to acknowledge the principle of. 
self-determination; 
10 Ruas, H. B. (coord.): A Revohiçao das Flores. Vol. I. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. pp. 294, 305-6. 
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2. the quickened development of colonies, the establishment of democratic institu-
tions; 
3. a plebiscite with alternatives of federation, confederation or independence; 
4. "independence" within the scope of a federation. 
However Spinola's conception, as outlined in his book in February, immedia-
tely encountered the resistance of the liberation movements, for whom April 25th 
opened an unexpected prospect of quick independence. Their relation to the 
Spinola-ist time-table was therefore well defined: "we are concerned in the chang-
ing of Portugal's regime to the extent to which the new government acknowledges 
our people's right to a complete independence" - declared the MOZAMBIQUE 
LIBERATION FRONT (FRELIMO), for example.11 So Portugal was compelled to 
contact fighting movements, and by the middle of June, the viewpoints of the 
negotiating parties became rigid: while Portugal acknowledged the principle of 
self-determination (which not involved independence) only on the stipulation of 
previous armistice; the liberation movements made armistice (regarded as merely 
a practical question) depend on the previous acknowledgement of the principle of 
self-determination (in the sense of independence) of the colony ruled exclusively 
by them. 
Portugal then decided to force the armistice on the liberation movements by 
military means. Recruits were called in, more than ever, and yet, the liberation 
movements had greater successes than ever before: the AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE (PAIGC) went on besieging 
surrounded towns, the FRELIMO started surrounding towns in Central Mozam-
bique and the divided PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA 
(MPLA) was also able, to gain victories. 
By continuing the war Portugal encountered insurmountable difficulties: even 
the colonial troops themselves were against it. After negotiations had been broken 
off between Portugal and FRELIMO in Lusaka, the Portuguese officers in Mo-
zambique demanded an end to the war in a meeting, then the "captains" directly 
11 O processo revolucionário de guerra popular de libertado. Collec$2o textos e documentos da 
FRELIMO. Maputo: Departamento do Trabalho da FRELIMO, 1977. p. 197. 
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contacted the FRELJMO. In Bissau, more than a thousand officers and soldiers of 
the colonial army "set up a claim for the Portuguese government's acknowledge-
ment of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the right of the people of Cape Verde 
Islands to self-determination and independence, the only political step which 
would lead to a real peace."12 Then the "captains" also directly contacted the 
PAIGC. 
Similar temptations took shape concerning other questions as well (pay-raises 
and strikes, a purge of the state apparatus, the mass media and the army, as well 
as an assertion os military hierarchy against "captains" etc.). Thus a stalemate 
developed by the beginning of July: the formal decision was in the hands of the 
Spinola-ists, however, the means of execution was held by the "captains" and their 
allies, so the talks between the two parties were interrupted when the colonial 
question become rigid in June. They could not go further according to the original 
compromise unless the power relations could be changed, but this required settling 
the matter of quandary: whether to acknowledge the independence or to continue 
the war. 
Spinola-ists, who now were compelled to take steps, started with the ultima-
tum of Prime Minister Palma Carlos. According to the proposal13 of the beginning 
of July, which formally proposed to modify the No. 3/74 law, the President of the 
Republic would be elected within three months, and at the same time a provisio-
nal constitution would be accepted, the elections to the Constituent National As-
sembly would be delayed till November, 1976, and the authority of the govern-
ment would be increased for the sake of disposing power. The ultimatum can be 
regarded as an attempted constitutional putsch with the goal of establishing a 
conservative Spinola-ist presidential regime, as: 
1. at the presidential elections, Spinola - with his probable victory - could have 
gained a legitimacy independent from the movements of the "captains"; 
12 Porch, D.: The Portuguese Armed Fortes and the Revolution. London: Croom Helm, 1977. p. 114. 
13 Rodrigues, A. - Borgia, C. - Cardoso, M.: Portugal depots de Abril. Lisboa: Intervoz, 1976. p. 40.; 
Kuntz, J.: Les fusils et les umes: le Portugal aujourd'huL Paris: Denoel, 1975. p. 27. 
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2. with the delay of the elections to the Constituent National Assembly, right-wing 
parties could have gained more time for consolidation; 
3. and the "captains"' position would have been shattered by subordinating military 
forces to the government. 
The proposal was dismissed by organs of power for different reasons, and in 
return the prime minister and his supporters abdicated. During the cabinet crisis, 
the subject of the debate on the surface was the person of the new prime minister, 
and the decision was enforced by military troops of the capital, directed by the 
"captains". The formal novelty of the second provisional government, coming to 
office on 17th July with the leadership of Vasco Gonçalves, was that the "captains" 
undertook a direct political role; the government essentially became social-democ-
rat dominated at the expense of the Spinola-ists. 
As an other important step, the "captains'" military centre was legalized as 
OPERATION COMMAND FOR THE CONTINENT (COPCON), setting the mainte-
nance of public order "in the spirit of 25th April" as a task, with a covert hint of 
being against police and gendarme forces. Its leader, Sarajva de Carvalho, became 
* commander of the military district of Lisbon at the same time, so that the "cap-
tains'" formal influence in military forces and political life suddenly increased. 
With the solution of the crisis of July, the balance of power changed within 
the initial alliance: the Spiiiola-ists lost ground. These the two opposed centres of 
power now became the President of the Republic (JSN) and the government 
(CCP). The position of Costa Gomes, who balanced and negotiated between them, 
was upgraded. 
The constitutional law, No. 7/74 of July 26th, which "better defined" the 
original program, was a decisive consequence of the changed balance of power 
and the most important political step in 20th century Portugal. "The principal, 
which considers the solution of overseas wars politically and not militarily, called 
forth Portugal's acknowledgement of the principle of people's self-determination", 
that the law expressed. On the other hand it undertook the main demand of, the 
liberation movements: "Acknowledging the principle of self-determination, with all 
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of its consequences, including the acceptance of the independence of overseas 
territories."14 
After the crisis of July, the emphasis within the finance-oligarchy was placed, 
by the supporters of federation, on those who agreed with some form of "neocolo-
nist" solution. With the decolonizational law, Spinola's function, in which he 
transgressed the limits of his original position, was the assurance of this solution. 
It stipulated the driving back of popular forces, especially the "captains"' move-
ment, in the motherland, and the liberation movements in the colonies. The 
organization of a "Spinola-ist bloc" of conservative-reactionary forces and a kind of 
"third power" in the colonies began accordingly. 
The moderate conservatives made a successful attempt at this in the long run: 
as a member of the European Christian-democratic Union, the CENTRE SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (CDS) evolved from Caetano's technocrats and from groups 
of bourgeoisie, becoming conservative now, under the leadership of Freitas do 
Amaral, in July. This party fundamentally represented a continuity of marcelism, 
under the changed circumstances. 
Problems of the forming "Spinola-ist bloc" were however of great significance: 
» 
1. clergy (who were influential even after April 25th) and monarchists could not 
be won over; 
2. internal conflicts within the ultras and the aloofness of moderate CDS indicated 
that they were divided; 
3. the radical fuglemen were the compromised elements of the old regime; 
4. Spinola as "supraparty representative of the nation" did not wish his person and 
position to enter into the service of political purposes (though he would have been 
glad to be a "silent partner" in a succesful political power again). The inherited 
state apparatus, lead now by Spinola, remained the hope of the bourgeoisie. 
After the decolonization law, it still remained an open question, who should 
practice self-determination in the name of "peoples of the colonies" and how. 
Spinola had to centralize decolonization in his own hands so as to drive back 
liberation movements for the benefit of a "third power" and in order to enforce 
14 Rúas, H. B. (coord.): A Revoluqao das Flores Vol. III. Lisboa: Aster, 1974. p. 67. 
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the referendum. 'It is the task of the President of the Republic to sign agreements 
concerning the practice of rights acknowledged in previous clauses after hearing 
out he JSN, the Council of State and the provisional government", he inserted in 
the law after a one-week delay.15 
In Guinea, which was considered a touchstone (where armed struggle had 
been decided long ago in favour of the PAIGC), Portugal, according to the agree-
ment16 signed on August 26th, acknowledged Guinea-Bissau as an independent 
state and the right to independence of the peoples of Cape Verde Islands on 
September 10th, 1974. 
There was no need for a "third power" in Angola: antagonism among three 
rival movements became the main obstacle to quick decolonization. After the 
inner turn of MPLA could not be enforced, Spinola decided to take a step which 
was extreme even from the standpoint of his own program: he signed a secret 
agreement with President of Zaire Mobutu, on September 14th. In compliance17 
with it, Spinola supported the NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF ANGOLA 
(FNLA) against the MPLA, he surrendered Cabinda to a small separatist move-
ment supported by Zaire, and he supported the establishment of a "federal repub-
lic" including Zaire, Angola and Cabinda under the presidency of Mobutu and the 
vice-presidency of Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA. In return, Mobutu gua-
ranted a twenty year exclusive right of Portuguese moriopols to exploit resources 
of the "federal republic", gained support in Africa for Spinola's "decolonizational" 
plan and helped win Guinea and Mozambique back in every way. 
With sinificant concessions, the agreement attracted Portuguese bourgeoisie 
with huge economic potential. For its execution, however, there was a need to 
militarily drive-back the MPLA, but the colonial army was not willing to fight 
15 Ibid. 
16 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 205-206. 
17 Diniz de Almeida op. cit. p. 158.; Porch op. cit. pp. 116-117. 
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here, either. A meeting of five hundred Portuguese officers in Angola, on Septem-
ber 18th, trought a decision to end the war.18 
Mozambique directly endangered the Spinoal-ist plan: as a viable "third po-
wer" could not be joined together, an agreement of independence was signed in 
Lusaka, on September 7th. Accordingly,19 until the date of independence, June 
25th, 1975, in the intermediate period Portugal and FRELIMO together guaran-
teed the process of the taking over of power. 
At the moment of signing the agreement, a revolt of settlers broke out in 
Lourengo Marques and spread over to Beira as well. Rebels rejected the agree-
ment of Lusaka, which had been signed without them, and they tried to negotiate 
with Portugal on the basis of a referendum. However, under the pressure from the 
"captains", the government of Portugal described the revolt as high-treason and the 
colonial army was mobilized against it. As a reaction, white settler ultras unilate-
rally announced the independence of Mozambique (which they had been planning 
since 1972). Although their hopes (support of Republic of South Africa and Rho-
desia as well as the change-over of Portuguese troops) did not materialize, and the 
rebelliqn was suppressed. 
The basis for the open political appearance of Spinola-ist forces was given by 
Spinola himself in his speech at acknowledging Guinea-Bissau on September 10th. 
"Decolonization", he interpreted the basic task again, "opposed to certain people's 
naive ideas, should not consist in a mere transfer of power to the party organiza-
tion that sustained the armed struggle against the former Portuguese regime".20 
For the sake .of the "authentic democracy", he appealed to the "silent majority": 
"the silent majority of the Portuguese nation must wake up at last to defend itself 
against extremist totalitarians".21 
18 Diniz de Almeida op. cit. pp. 156-157. 
19 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 207-212. 
20 Spinola, A. de: Ao serviço de Portugal. Lisboa: Atica-Livrdria Bertrand, 1976. p. 175. 
21 Ibid. p. 179. 
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Using the speech as a program, the radical right-wing organized a protest of 
the "silent majority" in the capital by September 28th. PPD and CDS joined, and 
they found active supporters among some members of JSN and the government. 
The protest was primarily financed by the monopol group Espirito Santo, white 
the mass media was also mobilized so as to influence public opinion. 
The substance of the plan22 was to introduce a military personal dictatorship 
(on the basis of an extraordinary situation), because of planned riots occuring 
during the protest, behind the back of the failing compromise between the bour-
geoisie and the popular classes, and relying on the "will" of the traditional middle-
classes. 
The civil (and military) "silent majority" of the society was still in a prepoliti-
cal situation, and was neutralized because Spinola's dictatorship would have meant 
a continuation of the war. So the crisis of September 27-28th was not solved 
within the scope of the clash of traditional middle-classes and the modern rank of 
wage-earners (as it was to one year later), but the struggle was fought in their 
names between the organized, civil right- and left-wing, and reflected in the con-
flicts of political and military leaders. 
The trial failed because of joining together of Costa Gomes, who held a key-
position, and COPCON.23 As a result, conservative and liberal forces were all the 
more driven back in the third provisional government, also lead by Gongalves, the 
JSN was purged, and the Spinola-ists were driven out of the MFA. In the place of 
Spinola, who was compelled to abdicate, General Francisco da Costa Gomes 
became the new provisional President of the Republic (simultaneously president 
of the JSN), which fact meant a return to the original conception of the "captains". 
In his installation speech24 of September 30th, he supported pluralist democracy as 
the only means "which can guarantee a field for creating real dimensions of hu-
man dignity"; promised to continue decolonization; acknowledged international 
22 Bronco Livro. 28 de Setembro. Lisboa: Avante, 1975. p. 62.; Orlando Neves op. cit. p. 61. 
23 Saraiva de Carvalho, O.: Cinco meses mudaram Portugal. Lisboa: Portugal, 1975. pp. 23-24. 
24 Orlando Neves op. cit. pp. 151-152. 
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duties, NATO membership among them; and promised to uphold the principle of 
peaceful coexistence. His role showed the efforts of weak, domestically oriented 
bourgeoisie to carry out its interests, already under the hegemony of popular 
forces. 
With the turn of the end of September, the conception, which was based on 
the absolute power of Spinola's conservative presidency failed, and the class-
alliance of April disintegrated. The new power no longer represented the interests 
(concerning first of all - but not only - the colonies) of federative and "neocolonia-
list" factions of the modern big bourgeoisie (who were united with foreign capital 
groups). 
The outline of the program of renewed power went back to the original 
conception of CAPTAINS' MOVEMENT, composing it again in the spirit of the 
slogan of the "three D-s" (descolonizag&o, democratiza^o, desenvolvimento) that 
hall-marked Portuguese revolution. 
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Marcelo Caetanonak a gyarmati háborúk miatt zsákutcába jutott kormánypolitikája ellenében a 
hadsereg két politikai áramlata kristályosodott ki. Spinola tábornok az uralkodó csoportok képvise-
lőjeként egy konzervatív elnöki rendszer keretében föderációt ígért a háború befejezése fejében. A 
"kapitányok" mozgalma (MFA) mint a népi osztályok képviselője egy demokratikus rendszer kereté-
ben a gyarmati népek önrendelkezését ígérte a békés rendezés érdekében. 
A rendszer megdöntésére szövetkezett két áramlat kompromisszumos platformja az alkotmányo-
zó nemzetgyűlési választásig tartó egy éves átmeneti időszakban a demokratikus átalakulást és a 
gyarmati kérdés politikai rendezését tűzte célul. 
Miután az MFA irányította katonai akció 1974. április 25-én megdöntötte Caetano rendszerét, 
Spinola ideiglenes köztársasági elnök "liberalizált" kolonializmusa szellemében indult meg a feladat-
megoldás. Ez a felszabadító mozgalmak katonai ellenállásába ütközött, s a háború folytatásával 
szembeszegült az MFA befolyásolta gyarmati hadsereg, a baloldali pártok és a tömegmozgalom. 
A patthelyzetet a júliusi politikai válság kimenetele oldotta fel: az induló szövetségben a spinolis-
ták rovására teret nyert az MFA. A hatalomcUoiödás következményeként július 26-án Portugália 
deklarálta a gyarmatok függetlensége értelmében veti dekolonizációt. 
A spinolisták ekkor megkísérelték "harmadik erők" kezére játszani a gyarmatokat, feltételeként 
pedig az MFA-t kiszorítani a hatalomból. A "csendes többség" elnöki diktatúrát cél//» szeptember 28-i 
megmozdulásának elvetélését azonban Spinola bukása követte. Ezzel felbomlott az uralkodó és a népi 
'osztályok áprilisi szövetsége.a: 
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